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The  Farmer's  Stake in Foreign  Trade
Today the United States occupies a position of new and strate-
gic  importance  in foreign  affairs.  Those of us who  are  engaged
in  the business of adult education  in  the  social  sciences  have  a
responsibility  for collecting  and disseminating  information  that
will enable our people to make sound judgments with respect  to
foreign policy.
Certainly  more  than  ever  before  an  increasing  number  of
people are  showing personal  interest  in and concern  for Amer-
ica's role in  foreign  affairs, and  they are attempting  to appraise
various courses of action. In a broad sense this includes not only
economic,  but also political  and military  policies.  But  these  are
all more or less interrelated.
The peoples of many nations today are virtually at a level of
abject poverty. In many instances we know their standard of liv-
ing is woefully  low. Some  steps  have  been  taken  to correct  this
situation, but it is realized that it must be done in a way that will
not undermine  our own  economic  health.  Possibly  some things
are  being  done  today  at  greater  expense  than  can  be  justified
as a matter of long-time policy.  If so, a logical question to ask is:
What  can  be done  by  way  of putting  our trade  relations  on  a
really  sound  long-time  economic  basis?  On  this  subject  three
papers have been prepared.
THE  FARMER'S  STAKE  IN  FOREIGN  TRADE
By Arthur Mauch
American  farmers,  in  1951,  sold  4  billion  dollars  worth  of
their  products  overseas,  to  foreign  consumers  they  never  saw
and often never knew were their customers.
Although  farmers  would  do  well  to get  10  percent  of  their
cash income  from their sales abroad  year after year,  many indi-
vidual commodities lean heavily on foreign demand. For example,
in 1949, the portion of the following products that was sold over-
seas  was  (in  round  numbers  as  a  percent  of  the  amount  pro-
duced):  rice  39 percent,  cotton  37  percent,  dried fruits  35  per-
9AGRICULTURE  DEPENDS  ON  EXPORTS
PERCENT  OF  U. S. PRODUCTION  EXPORTED  1949
RICE  38.8
COTTON  36.9
DRIED  FRUITS  ~  34.7
TOBACCO  LEAF  2  27.9
WHEAT  27.4
LARD  27.4
MILK  C  12.7
SOYBEANS  7.8
ORANGES  C~  4.2
GRAPEFRUIT  C  2.8
CANNED  FRUITS  J  12.5
PERCENT  10  20  30  40  50
cent,  tobacco leaf 28 percent,  wheat  27 percent,  lard 27 percent,
milk  13  percent,  soybeans  8  percent  and  oranges  4  percent.
The  farmer's  interest  in  exports  and  imports  hinges  pri-
marily on their effect on price. This varies  by commodities  and
involves many relationships that would be impossible to calculate.
E. J. Working1 points out that in 1950,  exports plus military and
other  government  purchases  amounted  to  9.9  percent  of  the
1935-39  average  food production.  If they had been  only 2.3  per-
cent, as in 1940, supplies available  in the domestic market would
have been  increased  by 7.6  percent of the  1935 level  of produc-
tion.  He  suggests  that  such  an  increase  might  be  expected  to
decrease  retail prices of food by about 30 percent.
HOW  FARM  EXPORT  TRADE  DEVELOPED
Agricultural  America  grew  up  by  trading  its  raw materials
for Europe's  finished  goods.  Historically American  farmers pro-
duced not merely for their own neighborhood,  but  for  the rest
of the nation, and for the world.
As  producers  for  the  world  market,  American  farmers  had
special  advantages.  They had  access  to  new  lands.  These  lands
lJournal  of Farm Economics, May  1952,  p.  221.
10were  adapted  to  use  of  machinery  and  large-scale  production
methods. Because  the American farmer  could sell at a low price,
and  because  of  a good  demand  across  the Atlantic,  there  was  a
continuous market for farm products.
Before World War I we exported one fifth of our wheat,  two
thirds of our cotton,  two fifths  of our  tobacco,  and  one  eighth
of our pork. Loss of the export market after the war had a drastic
effect on such farm products as wheat and cotton.  Because of the
economic  nature of the demand for farm  products, even  a small
decline in export demand may cause a disastrous decline in price.
There  is little  doubt that the  high  food exports  needed  during
World War II, and for relief and economic recovery after the war,
have been a major  factor in maintaining high farm prices.
EMPLOYMENT  AND  EXPORTS
The  most  important  farm  market  is  the  home  market.  But
the extent of this demand depends on full employment  at reason-
able  wages.  Millions  of  United  States  jobs depend  on  exports
of industrial products. An estimate was made in 1949 showing the
number  of  workers  depending  on  foreign  demand  as  follows:
U.S.  JOBS  DEPEND  ON  EXPORTS-1949
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Itrade  and  services  305,000;  machinery  290,000;  transportation
225,000;  primary metal industries  155,000;  textiles,  apparel, and
leather  135,000;  fuel and  power  125,000;  transportation  equip-
ment  95,000;  chemicals  85,000;  metal  products  70,000;  lumber
and furniture 40,000;  paper and related  products  40,000;  stone,
clay,  and  glass  35,000;  and  all  other  manufacturing  100,000.
These add up to  1,700,000, not including workers in agriculture.
THE  FARMER  AS  A  CONSUMER
Sometimes  the  farmer  forgets  that he  is a  consumer,  too.  If
he  can  get  more  for his  dollar  by  buying  imported  goods,  his
income  will provide  a better living  for his  family.
Half of all  the  products  we  import are  things  which we  do
not produce at all or produce only  in small quantities.  Some  of
them we  see and use so often in our daily  lives,  that until they
are in short supply-as they were during the war-we seldom think
of how much we  depend  on them.  Sugar,  coffee,  vegetable  oils,
newsprint, nickel, tin, rubber, manganese,  chocolate, pepper, and
bananas are only a part of the list.
The  government  stockpiling  program  involving  dozens  of
strategic  raw  materials  emphasizes  our  dependence  on  foreign
trade  for defense  purposes as well  as for creating a high level of
living for consumers.
BARRIERS  TO  TRADE
The  first and the most  important  obstacle  to imports  is fear
-fear  both here and in foreign countries, but in each case working
against  an increase  in imports to  the  United States.
Manufacturers,  producers,  and exporters  abroad  look at  the
extraordinary  productive  capacity  of  the  United States  and  the
amazing  productive  skill  of  the  American  people.  They  are
afraid that they cannot compete  effectively  in our home market.
And so  they do  not really try.
But the  "giant"  is  also  afraid.  There  is  fear  that  to  bring
into  this  country a  larger volume  of  things  that  people  in  this
country want  at  prices  they  can afford  to  pay  will  be  harmful,
not  beneficial  - fear  that  someone  is going  to  be  hurt.
12Many  farmers  and  workers  fear  that  a  lowering  of  trade
barriers  would  mean  lowering  our  standards  of  living  to  the
level  of  those  with  whom  we  trade.  This  fear  is  not  easy  to
brush  aside.  And we  must  admit  it  is  a  factor  to  be reckoned
with  in  some  lines  where  efficiency  has  been  developed  to  a
high level  even in countries with low levels  of living.  Nor can
we  overlook  the  fact  that our  inflated  cost  structure,  due  pri-
marily  to  wage  increases,  will  make  it even  more  difficult  for
us  to compete  for world  markets.
For most products this fear is not well grounded. The United
States itself  has demonstrated  the  fallacy  of this kind of reason-
ing.  In  the  past  century  we  have  had very  high  wage  rates  in
some industrial areas,  while in other areas, notably  in the South,
some extremely  low real  incomes.  Yet  other farmers  and  work-
ers  did not find that  their  level  of  living was  lowered  by  trad-
ing with  those  in  low-income  areas.  Actually  the  evidence  indi-
cates  that this trade has been mutually beneficial  and that those
in  low-income  areas  have  been  upgraded  to become  better  cus-
tomers  and better citizens.  Furthermore,  there  is  evidence  that
the highest wages are paid, not by protected industries, but by the
efficient  industry operating free from trade barriers.
The real basis of comparison  should  be  wage costs per unit,
not wage  rates  per  hour.  Labor  at  50  cents  a  day  may  not be
cheap  labor.  Because  of  lack  of  capital  goods  to  make  labor
efficient  many  days  may be required  to produce  an article  that
with a  machine could be  finished in  a few  minutes.  Of course,
if  we  insisted  on  making  pottery  by  hand,  our  laborer  would
have  to  accept  the  wage  of  the  Mexican  peon  with  whom  he
would  compete.  We  export  rice in  competition with Asia  only
because  we  use  the  airplane,  the  tractor,  and  other  machines
where  they use manpower.  Australian  wool  is competitive,  but
the  main  reason  for  the  decline  in  sheep  production  in  the
United  States  is  the  greater  opportunity  to  make  money  in
cattle,  milk,  and  other  enterprises.  Sheep  could  not  compete
with other livestock  for our scarce  resources.
The  more  real  competitive  danger  comes  from  a  country
that  subsidizes  exports  because  it  is  under  pressure  to  obtain
dollars.  This creates  unfair competition  for our producers.  If
other countries could export  more products  in which they have
a  real  advantage,  they  would  have  less  need  to  obtain  dollars
13by  uneconomic  subsidies,  and at the  same  time  we  would  gain
by  getting low-cost  materials.
It is argued,  too, that trade barriers should be used to protect
"infant" industries. This will  allow  them  to  survive  until  they
can become  strong enough to compete  in a  world market.  Con-
tinuation of the  protection,  however,  is usually  justified on  the
grounds that the industry was established with the expectation  of
protection  and  that vested  interests  will  be  harmed  by  the  re-
moval  of trade  barriers.  In  this  way  a  permanent  monopolistic
advantage  can  be gained.
It is also argued that imports should be restricted to encourage
diversification cf  enterprises.  As  a  result,  we  would  be  more
self-sufficient  and suffer  less  in time of war.  True,  we  would  be
more self-sufficient  - but undoubtedly  at a lower  level of living.
This  might  mean  using  our  non-replaceable  natural  resources
at a faster rate.  It would surely  mean inefficient  use of resources
and higher costs.  Perhaps we would be  less strong and  less able
to protect ourselves  in case of war.
The  United  States  now  produces  about  half of  the  world's
industrial goods-but mines only a third of the world's minerals.
U.S.  PRODUCES  OVER  HALF  THE  WORLD'S  INDUSTRIAL
OUTPUT  BUT  MINES  ONLY  A  THIRD  OF  WORLD  MINERAL  OUTPUT
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Source:  FREEDOM  AND  UNION,  OCTOBER  1950
14The latest national resources report  indicates that  25 years  from
now  we  will  have  42  million  more  people  and  will  need  42
percent more  food,  54 percent  more  iron and coal,  109  percent
more oil and  gas, 4  times more  aluminum,  18  times  more  mag-
nesium, 40 to 50 percent more copper, lead, zinc, and manganese,
and  tremendous  increases  in  all other materials.  Even  now we
are not self-sufficient  in most of these.
Some  imports  have  been restricted  to hold down  the cost of
domestic subsidies to  producers.  For example,  in order  to pro-
tect the government from even greater  losses in the potato price-
support program a few years ago, it was necessary to stop imports
of potatoes from Canada.  Section  104 of the Defense Production
Act  directs  the President  to  prohibit  imports  of farm  products
for  reasons  that  may  be interpreted  so  broadly  that  they could
apply  to any commodity at any time.  Cheese imports have  been
restricted  under this act.  Repercussions  from  abroad have  been
so great that it is now referred  to by some as  "the cheese  amend-
ment."  The situation is analyzed in the July  1952  issue of Farm
Policy Forum, published  by  the  Iowa  State  College  Press,  as
follows:
In  the first  6  months  of  1951,  American  cheese  production
was running at the annual  rate of just below  1.2  billion  pounds.
Cheese  imports  stood  at  55 million  pounds.  This was  less  than
5  percent  of  our  domestic  production.  Because  of  the  cheese
amendment,  imports  were  cut  down  to  an  annual  rate  of  37
million  pounds  beginning  in  August  1951.
This  reduction  of  18  million  pounds  supposedly  makes  a
difference  between  a healthy  and  a ruined  dairy industry!  When
it's remembered  that barely  10 percent  of all the milk  produced
annually  in  the  United  States goes  into  cheese  production,  the
theory  becomes  even  harder  to  believe.
What's  more, most  of the imported  cheeses  do not  compete
with  our  domestic  prices.  Almost  without  exception,  imported
cheeses  are higher  priced.  Many  are  not  made  here  at  all.  But
the  amendment  slaps  controls  on  all  cheeses-even  though
reduced  consumption  of many  of  them wouldn't  add  one  iota
to  consumption  of  domestic  cheeses.
The  damage  done  by  the  cheese  amendment  is  threefold.
Economically,  we're  keeping  Europe  from  earning  dollars.  It's
difficult  for us to realize  what the cheese  amendment  has meant
to  countries  like  Italy  and  Denmark--which  in  1950  derived
10  percent  of  their  dollar  earnings  from  cheese
15A country can't buy what it can't pay for. Therefore,  either
we  reduce  our  exports  because  of  curtailed  imports - or  we
finance  exports  with foreign-aid  dollars  as  we have  done in the
past.  Apparently,  the Senate  would prefer to give  our resources
away  than  to  be  paid  for  them  in imports.
The  second  damage  is  psychological.  We're  forfeiting  our
role  of  leadership  in freeing world trade -and  at  a time  when
we're  asking  Europe  to  "integrate."  We  want  European  coun-
tries  to  remove  trade  barriers  and  to  expose  each  nation  to
intra-European  competition;  we  think  this  will  make  Europe
stronger  and  war  less  likely.
Finally,  there's  the  political  damage.  The  cheese  amend-
ment offers the sort of unfavorable propaganda  that our enemies
might have  to invent - if we didn't voluntarily hand it to them.
For years  they've  said that America's  aim,  through the  Marshall
Plan,  was  to conquer  the markets  of  Europe while  keeping  our
own  tightly  closed.
Now  they have  proof
Another  argument  for trade  restriction  is that  interdepend-
ence  means  that  depressions and booms  of  other nations cause
like  disturbances in  this country.  Since  we  are  the giant,  this
appears to be a better reason for other countries  to shun a  tie-up
with  us than vice  versa.
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REASONS  FOR  TRADE  BARRIERS
/  FEAR  OF  LOW-WAGE  COMPETITION
/  PROTECT  INFANT  INDUSTRIES
/  ENCOURAGE  DIVERSIFICATION
/  PROTECT  PRICE  SUPPORT  PROGRAMS
/  AVOID  WORLD  DEPRESSIONS
/  ECONOMIC  AND  POLITICAL  BARGAINING
____Still  another  reason  for maintaining  barriers,  or at  least  a
threat of barriers,  is that since other nations have  them, we must
use  them for  bargaining  purposes at the  international  confer-
ence  table.  This may  be  even  more  useful  politically  than eco-
nomically.  Again  there  are  many  indications  that  results  of
trade  barriers  are  more  likely  to  lead  to  retaliation,  interna-
tional  difficulties,  economic  warfare,  and  perhaps  even  world
wars.
KINDS  OF  BARRIERS
When  people  mention  trade  barriers  they  usually  are  re-
ferring to  a  tariff.  Tariffs  are  taxes or  import  duties  on  goods
brought  into  a  country.  They  are  the  most  widely  used  of
barriers  but are  not the  most  drastic.  They  do  not completely
prohibit imports  unless  the duty  is clear  out of  reason.
In  administering  the  tariffs,  customs  officials  must  make
arbitrary decisions on classifications  and rate applications.  For
example,  does  10  cents  worth  of  lace  on  a  dollar's  worth  of
cotton  goods  justify  classifying  the  garment  as  lace  goods,  sub-
ject  to  a high duty,  or as  cotton  goods  which  may  be at  a  low
rate  or  even  duty  free?  Oftentimes  our  antiquated  customs
regulations more effectively  discourage  trade  than do  the actual
tariff rates.  It  is sometimes  as long as three  or five  years before
an  importer  knows  exactly  the amount  of  duty  he  will  be  re-
quired  to  pay.  In some  cases  he  has  been  charged  more  than
the total  sale price  of the  goods.
Quotas are  even  more  restrictive  than  tariffs.  They  limit
imports  to specific  quantities.  The  trend  is  toward  greater  use
of the quota.
A quota of zero, of course,  is an "embargo."  This restriction
often  is used  to  protect  against  importing  animal  or plant  dis-
eases.  In  time of war  it may  be an  embargo  against  exports  of
materials  that would aid the  enemy.  Unfortunately,  protection
of health may be used as an excuse to gain  a monopoly position.
Money exchange rates may be manipulated to regulate trade.
If  X  country  wishes  to discourage  imports  and  encourage  ex-
ports  it can  make  its  own  money worth  less in  other countries
and conversely make it possible for other currencies  to buy more
per unit  in  X country.  Or even  more  likely,  they  may  give  a
17favorable  rate  to  a  commodity  they  wish  to  export  or  import
and a less  favorable  rate  to  those  they  wish  to avoid.
The  import license  by  a  government  is  another  device  to
restrict trading.  It may have  the effect  of a quota or in extreme
cases even be  an effective  embargo.
Our federal,  and  many of  our state  and  local  governments,
which  spend  billions  of  dollars  each  year  for  supplies  and
equipment  are  required  to  "buy  American."  The federal  gov-
ernment,  for example,  is  prohibited  from buying foreign  mate-
rials,  or  commodities  manufactured  from  foreign  materials,
unless  these  materials  are  not  available  in  the  United  States,
or  unless  the  prices  of  corresponding  domestic  items  are  un-
reasonable.  "Unreasonable"  is  usually  interpreted  as  meaning
considerably  more  expensive - perhaps  as  much  as  25  percent
more.
We  often  must  tell  citizens  of  friendly  countries  that  we
cannot accept their offer to haul our goods in their ships because
we are obligated  to use our own vessels regardless  of  the service
or  cost.  The  labor  cost  for  a  ship  operated  by  the  United
18





/  CONTROLLED  EXCHANGE  RATE
/  IMPORT  LICENSEStates  is  estimated  to  be  nearly  double  that  of  one  operated
by  England.
In  the  United  States  the  high  point  in  these  restrictions
was reached  in  1930 when we  imposed  the Smoot-Hawley  tariff
rates  to keep  the  American  market  to ourselves.  Within  a year
and a half, about 25 countries had adopted retaliatory  measures.
Under the Reciprocal  Trade Agreement  Act in 1934  the  execu-
tive  branch  of our government  was  authorized  to bargain  with
other  nations  to  reduce  tariffs  and  other  trade  barriers.  The
maximum reduction was limited to 50 percent of the  1934 level,
but  in  1945  another  reduction  of  50  percent  of  the  rate  in
effect  on  January  1, 1945,  was  authorized.  So  far  these  agree-
ments  have reduced our rates  to about half the  level reached  in
1934.
A high tariff  does  not assure  a high  price.  The  farmer  saw
wheat  at  97  cents  in  1914  when  it  was  duty  free;  at  92  cents
in  1923  when  the  tariff  was  30  cents;  and at  38  cents  in  1932
when  the  tariff  was  42  cents.  In  wheat  we  are  on  an  export
basis.  Tariffs  are  effective  only when  we  import.  In  the  Con-
gressional  log-rolling  process,  farmers  were  led  to  believe  they
were getting a bargain when they accepted a high tariff on wheat
in  exchange  for  other  tariffs  that  raised  their  costs.
Farmers  should  also  recognize  that  they  do  not  have  an
equal  interest  in  tariffs.  The  markets  for some  farm  products
depend heavily  on exports  and on the ability of foreign  nations
to  buy  them.  Wheat,  cotton,  and  tobacco  are  examples.  On
the other hand,  producers  of wool,  sugar, fruits,  rice,  and many
other  commodities  are  concerned  with  competition  of  foreign
products.  All  farmers,  however,  are  interested  as  consumers
and also  because  of  the impact  of  a  healthy  foreign  commerce
on  the  general  prosperity  of  this  country.
STUFF  FOR  STUFF
In  1951  the  United States exported  about  15  billion  dollars
worth  of  merchandise  and  imported  almost  11  billion  dollars
worth.  The  excess  of  exports  over  imports,  or  net  export  bal-
ance,  was  thus about  4 billion dollars.  This  is  the "dollar  gap"
we hear so much about. This is generally known  as a "favorable"
balance  of  trade.  But  is  it really  favorable  to  us?  Let's  look  at
some  facts.
19U.S.  FOREIGN  TRADE  BY  COMMODITIES-1951




Cars, Trucks, Tractors  1.2
Textiles  .6
RAW  MATERIALS  $4.7
Cotton  $1.1
Wheat  .9
Manufact'd  Foodstuffs  .8





Pulp and  Newsprint  $ .9
Refined  Metals  .8
Sawed  Lumber
Gas and  Fuel  Oil
.2
.2




Sugar and  Molasses
Metal  Ores
Crude  Petroleum
*Also  includes semi-manufactures
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CANADA  UNITED  BRAZIL  OTHER  EUROPE  ASIA
KINGDOM  WESTERN  (EXCEPT
HEMISPHERE  UNITED
KINGDOM)International  trade  is  an  exchange  of  stuff  for  stuff.  Of
course,  credit  may  be  used  to  postpone  the  payment.  Buyers
pay  for foreign  purchases  in  four principal  ways:  (1)  the  sale
and  shipment  of  goods,  both  raw  and  manufactured;  (2)  the
sale  of  services  such  as  ocean  transportation  and  spending  by
travelers;  (3)  the  sale  of  stocks,  bonds,  and  real  property;  and
(4)  the  shipment  of  gold.
When  the  United  States  was  young  we  borrowed  heavily
from  Europe  to  develop  our  resources  quickly.  As  a  debtor
nation  we  paid  our  debts  largely  with  raw  materials,  which
Europe  as  a creditor nation, readily  accepted  in return  for  the
money  lent  us.  Since  it  was  necessary  for  so  many  years  for
us to  have  a  net export  balance  to  pay  our debts  we  got  used
to  calling  this  a  "favorable"  balance.
The  tide  was  turned  in World  War  I.  Europe  was  desper-
ately  in  need  of our goods and  services.  We  not only paid  our
debts  in  full,  but Europe  became  heavily  indebted  to  us.  The
shoe  was  on  the  other  foot.  But  we  failed  to  recognize  it.
When  Europe  tried  to  send  us  goods  to  pay  the  debt  we
increased  our  trade  barriers  to  protect  special  interest  groups
from  foreign competition.  This made  it impossible  for them to
pay  their debts.
Since  1914 the United  States has not had  a single  year  with
a net import balance,  and the total export  balance has mounted
to well over  a hundred billion  dollars.  To get some  idea of  the
magnitude of this sum let us imagine  the people in this country
receiving payment  in  homes.  This would  be  equivalent  to  10
million  $10,000  homes  or  enough  for  about  one  out  of  every
four  families  in  this country.
Perhaps  this  balance  of  exports  over  imports  has  been
favorable  to certain  producers  in this country,  and temporarily
favorable  to  consumers  in  other  countries.  But  there  is  no
doubt  that the  definition  of  "favorable"  balance  for  a creditor
nation  should  be  surplus  of  imports  over  exports  in  the  long
run.
IT  PAYS  TO  SPECIALIZE  AND  TRADE
Our  history  has  emphatically  demonstrated  that  it  pays  to
specialize  in  the  production  of  things  that  each  person  is  best
fitted  to  produce.  By  trading  with  others  we  can  have  more
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total  goods  and  services  than  by  attempting  to produce  every-
thing for our own needs.  The  artificial  boundary  lines between
nations should have no real bearing on this economic  principle.
If one  producer  could  grow  twice  as  much  wheat  per  day
as  another,  and  the  other could  weave  twice  as  much  cloth  as
the  first,  each  would  obviously  gain  by  concentrating  on  his
specialty  and  trading with  the  other.  It is  not  so  obvious,  but
equally  true,  that the  first  party could have  a  comparative  pro-
duction advantage  in both wheat  and  cloth and  yet  both could
gain  by  specializing.  This  is  true  where  the  difference  in  effi-
ciency  is not  the  same  for each  article.  In  this case  the  second
party  puts  more  of  his  time  on  the  product  in  which  he  has
the  least  disadvantage,  and  the  first  party  on  the  product  in
which he  has the  greatest  advantage.
CONCLUSION
The  fundamental  reason  for  maintaining  and  expanding
American  foreign  trade  is to increase  the economic  strength and
the welfare  of the  United States.  A nation's  wealth  is  increased
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22if  it  trades  the  goods  which  it  produces  more  efficiently  than
can  other countries  for  foreign  goods  which  it  needs  but  does
not  produce,  and  for  goods  which  are  produced  more  eco-
nomically  abroad.  Through  foreign  trade,  a  nation  can  obtain
the  goods  it imports  with  less  effort  and in  greater  volume  by
producing  the  export  goods  which  it  exchanges  for  them  than
by attempting  to produce  these  goods  itself.
Our  foreign  trade  provides  jobs  in  American  export  in-
dustries.  Jobs  in  other  domestic  industries  also  result  from
purchases  made  by workers  employed  in  the  export industries.
Jobs  in  export  industries  are  high-wage  jobs,  as  statistics  con-
firm.  Efficiency  in  production  enables  the  United  States  to
compete  in world  markets  while  paying  high  wages.  Any  in-
crease  in our exports  causes an increase  in  the number  of  these
highly paid  jobs;  any  decrease  in  exports  results  in  a  decrease
in  these  jobs  and  wages,  and  in  purchasing power.
We  do  not  lose  dollars  when  we  buy  foreign  goods.  The
only place where the  dollar is any  good  is for purchase  of goods
in  the  United  States.
INDICES  OF  FOREIGN  TRADE,  PAYROLLS  IN
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23Foreign countries cannot buy our exports without American
dollars.  In  the  final  analysis,  the only  way  in  which  they  can
earn  dollars  is  by  selling  goods  and  services  to  the  United
States.  For all practical  purposes, every  dollar spent on imports
returns  to  the  United  States  in  payment  for exports  produced
by American  workers.  The dollar  earnings  of foreign countries,
since  the end  of  the  war,  have  been  inadequate  for buying  all
the American  exports  they  urgently  need  to prevent  economic
chaos  and  a  general  spread  of  communism.  Consequently  the
American taxpayer has financed exports valued at several billion
dollars  annually.
In  the  present  serious  circumstances,  our  foreign  trade  is
more  vital  than  ever  to  the  security  of  the  United  States  and
the  rest  of  the  free  world.  Our  imports  give  us  many  of  the
things  most  needed  for  increasing  our  material  resources  and
production  to meet critical  national defense  requirements.  Our
exports  provide  the  other  free  nations  with  the  goods  they
desperately  need  to  cooperate  effectively  against  possible  Com-
munist aggression  as well  as  to prevent  the  economic.want,  dis-
tress,  and  unrest which  breed  communism  internally.
In  formulating  a  long-run  trade  policy  the  United  States
can  do  one,  or a  combination  of  the  following:
(1)  We  can cut exports,  which would  have  a  serious  effect
on  the  United  States  economy  and  create  unemployment.
(2)  We  can  continue  indefinitely  to make  gifts  of  dollars,
which means  the United States will never be paid for its exports
and the American  taxpayer will  make  up  the  difference.
(3)  Or  we  can  allow  the  nations  of  the  free  world  who
need American  products  for  our  joint  defense  to  sell  us  their
products  and  so  help  earn  the  dollars  they  need  to  pay  us.
Americans  must choose!
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